存款结构、挤兑风险与存款保险偿付限额调整

Deposit Structure,Bank Run Risk and Reimbursement Limit Adjustment of Deposit Insurance System

构建一个由短期和长期储蓄存款储户所组成的异质性全局博弈模型,并在模型均衡解以及我国当前储蓄存款利率水平和储户数量结构的基础上分析了存款账户偿付限额调整对挤兑风险的影响。研究表明:未约束偿付总额时,提高偿付限额可以加速降低挤兑风险,且在偿付限额相同的条件下,持有长期存款的储户具有较低的挤兑动机;若约束偿付总额,则当持有某一期限存款储户的数量较少时,对其设置较高的偿付限额可能导致挤兑风险的显著下降,并且通过调整偿付限额降低挤兑风险时难以兼顾公平与效率。

This paper bulids a global game model with heterogeneous payment and noise structure of private signal and gets a unique strategy surviving iterated deletion of strictly interim-dominated solution.Based on this solution,given the term and quantity structure of savings deposit,the variation of risk of bank runs is analyzed when the compensation limit changes.If the total cost of compensation is ignored,the risk of bank runs is negative to compensation limit and the number of long-term deposit holders who have the same compensation limit as short-term deposit holders.However,given the total cost of compensation,there are two incompatible strategy spaces that a certen type deposit,with sufficiently high compensation limit,whose number is less than other type can lead risk of bank runs down or else increasing compensation limit of long-term deposit will be attractive.Moreover,the conclusion indicates yet that the＂fairness＂and ＂efficiency＂could not be satisfying simultaneously by adjusting the compensation limit.