基于双渠道环境下在位制造商的阻止策略研究

A study on external manufacturer entering deterrence strategy in the dual-channel supply chain

双渠道运营以提高顾客的购买体验为核心,不仅要求各渠道建立合理定价策略,同时要实现渠道间协同,这放大了制造商与零售商之间乃至整条供应链的冲突,进一步刺激链外企业进入行为,从而加剧在位制造商采取阻止策略.基于链外进入行为的普遍性与在位阻止的现实性,研究结果表明：当进入成本较低时,在位制造商无法阻止外来制造商进入;当进入成本过高时,在位制造商不用改变定价即可阻止进入;而当进入成本适中时,在位制造商可以通过降低产品在直销渠道上的零售价达到阻止进入的目的.同时结合数值计算得到了一些管理启示.

The dual-channel operation is to improve the customer＇s purchasing experience as the objective. Not only the channels need to maintain their suitable pricing strategies, but they need to realize the service coordination between channels, which will be amplified the conflict between the manufacturers and the retailers and the whole supply chain, and further stimulate the manufacturer entering behavior, thus exacerbate the incumbent manufacturer＇s use the deterrence strategy. In this paper, we consider the incumbent manufacturer＇s optimal deterrence strategy when facing the entry threat of external manufacturer.The result shows that the incumbent cannot deter the external manufacturer from entering the market when channel cost is low, and the incumbent need not to deter when channel cost is high. In addition,the incumbent can reduce the selling price to deter the entry when the channel cost is moderate. Our conclusions reveal entry and deterrence strategies from different members＇ perspectives under dual-channel supply chain and the results have practical significance.