非对称环境下政府采购拍卖模型及配置效率研究

A government procurement auction model and its allocation efficiency in the asymmetric setting

鉴于采购拍卖在供给侧改革中的重要引导作用,这一特殊市场交易方式被广泛应用于我国各级政府购买性支出中,涉及资金规模巨大,这类资金配置效率如何？在非对称的采购拍卖环境下,本文以竞标者的获胜概率为突破口,建立一个政府采购拍卖模型,进而,演绎出投标者的均衡投标策略和政府的最优采购机制,发现：我国目前政府采购机制存在低效率的配置空间,其症结是政府与国有企业间的利益分成关系所致,若在投标中公开这一分成关系,即可改进政府采购资金的配置效率;对政府而言,设计一个激励相容的采购机制,不但保证了竞标结果的有效性,还可以保护竞标企业的私密信息,降低政府的采购支出.依据文中的结论,我们认为应从信息公开,机制设计和市场竞争公平性三方面优化我国采购体制,以改进政府支出效率.

Since the procurement auction plays an important guiding role in supply side reform, it is widely used in central and local governments as a way of purchase expenditure, and associated capital scale is huge. It is natural to ask how the allocation efficiency of such expenditure is. In the asymmetric setting, a government procurement auction model is developed by introducing a new method to address the winning probability. Moreover, the asymmetric equilibrium bidding strategies for bidders and the optimal procurement mechanism for the government are given. It is found there exists the inefficiency allocation of procurement expenditure. The underlying reason is the profit-share relationship between government and state-owned enterprises. Once the profit-sharing information is public, the inefficiency allocation can be corrected. Besides, for the government, designing a procurement mechanism with incentive compatibility can not only avoid the inefficiency allocation, but also protect the private information of bidding enterprises and decrease the procurement payment. According to the results obtained, we propose that Chinese government procurement should be improved from three aspects of information publicity, mechanism design and fair competition.