高管薪酬凭能力还是凭运气——基于高管薪酬业绩敏感性的研究

CEO Compensation Depends on Ability or Fortune:On the Sensitivity of CEO Compensation Performance

在已有文献的基础上,将公司业绩分离为"高管能力决定"的公司相对业绩和"不确定性"影响的行业冲击业绩,探究我国上市企业公司业绩对高管薪酬的影响。研究发现:公司相对业绩及行业冲击业绩均对高管薪酬具有正向影响;进一步,民营企业高管薪酬对行业冲击业绩和公司相对业绩的敏感性均显著高于国有企业;另外,市场竞争加强了高管薪酬对行业冲击业绩和公司相对业绩的敏感性。这表明,高管薪酬不仅是高管能力的体现,还包含运气的成分;同时,更注重业绩的民营企业和竞争性行业,也更容易受外部因素的影响。这也意味着,不论是产权性质不同带来的公司内部治理的变化,还是市场竞争程度变化带来的企业外部治理的改良,都无助于甄别行业因素的影响。

This paper discusses the effect of firm performance on CEO compensation by considering both industry factors and firm-specific factors based on previous literature. It is found that both industry shock performance and firm-specific performance have a positive impact on CEO compensation. Private enterprises are more sensitive to both industry shock performance and firm-specific performance on CEO compensation,comparing with state-owned enterprises. Those enterprises with fiercer competition react more intensely than those with little competition. Consequently,it can safely conclude that CEO compensation is the result of his ability and it also includes the element of fortune. The CEO compensation of those enterprises run by individual and that with fiercer competition are more performance-oriented and more susceptible to industry factors. That is to say,both the change of firms＇ internal governance caused by the difference of property rights and the improvement of firms＇ external management caused by the different degree of market competition make no contribution to identify industry factors.