独立董事的新角色:诉讼风险防护——基于谷歌的案例研究

A New Role of Independent Directors: Litigation Risk Buff ering——A Case Study of Google

本文以谷歌三元股权改革案例为对象,分析谷歌的独立董事在股权改革过程中的角色。分析表明,与现有公司治理理论认为独立董事主要发挥监督作用不同,从三元股权的提出到实施,谷歌公司独立董事所起到的主要作用并不是监督企业实际控制人的决策,而是起到了调和创始人与其他股东矛盾,降低诉讼风险的作用。本文以谷歌三元股权变更过程中独立董事实际发挥的作用为例,通过讨论后倾向于认为,对于一些企业尤其是一些高科技企业而言,独立董事可以通过降低企业实际控制人所承担的诉讼风险,进而一定程度上保护甚至增加企业价值。

This paper analyzes Google＇s 2012 recapitalization case and discusses the role that Google＇s independent directors have served herein. Our analysis and discussion shows that during the recapitalization, the independent directors successfully mitigate the interest conflicts between Google＇s founders and its outside shareholders, and buffer the litigation risk arising from outside backlash. We also reveal that, contrary to the prediction of current corporate governance theory, in this case, Google＇s independent directors do not effectively monitor the founders, who are the actual decision makers of Google. Thus, on the ground of Google＇s 2012 recapitalization case, we tend to argue that independent directors are able to protect and even increase firm value through buffering the litigation risk faced by decision makers, especially in high-tech companies similar to Google.