意志、自然法与人的类型——阿奎那对亚里士多德式伦理学的改造

Will,Natural Law and Types of Human:Aquinas's Transformation of Aristotelian Ethics

阿奎那在亚里士多德主义的伦理学中引入了意志概念,并将之设为人性行为的始点。而在亚里士多德那里,"希望"并不等同于意志,不同类型的人有不同的欲望,"理智欲望"只属于少数人。道德行为的始点既可能是理性,也可能是欲望。在阿奎那看来,亚里士多德在始点问题上的模棱两可将导致"恶性循环",从而无法解释德性之产生。通过将意志理论立基于自然法,阿奎那解决了这一问题。由此,阿奎那对人性行为的理解较亚里士多德更为理性化,律法因素也在其伦理学中得到了更为突出的强调。

Aquinas introduces the conception of will to Aristotelian ethics and sets it as the starting point of human actions. Aristotle＇s ＂wish＂,however,is different from will for different people have different types of desire,and ＂intellectual desire＂only belongs to the minority of people. Either reason or desire can be the starting point of moral actions. In Aquinas＇ s opinion,Aristotle＇s ambiguity in the issue of starting point would lead to a＂vicious circle＂,which fails to explain the formation of virtue. By setting the will theory on the basis of the natural law,Aquinas solves the problem. Thus,his understanding of human actions is more rational,and the primacy of law has also been emphasized in his ethics.