意向性的句法与句法的意向性:胡塞尔对表象与判断,及其符号表达的研究

Intentionality of Syntax and Syntactic Intentionality:Husserl’s Analysis of Presentation,Judgement and Expression of Sign

本文讨论了胡塞尔对作为意向行为的表象与判断,以及作为其表达的名称与陈述的分析。根据胡塞尔,前者的区分乃是后者之区分的基础。一个表象乃是对一个对象的直接把握,而在一个判断中,能够被表象构建之物则被包含在命题的句法结构之中,成为一个不自足的句法成分。在此,命题乃判断的意向对象,而判断则构建了命题的意向行为。相比于对它们的表述,判断和表象都是更为充实的意向。而根据胡塞尔的后期思想,对某物的判断,亦扎根于对某物的直接把握。

This article studies Husserl＇s analysis of intentional acts, which are expressed presentation and judgement as by name and assertion. For Husserl, the distinction between expressions is founded on the distinction between acts expressed. A presentation is the direct experience of an individual thing, while the noema of a judgement is a proposition, to which an individual thing is only a syntactical part. Expressions of both a judgement and a name are emptier. Also, according to Husserl＇s later thought, a judgement about something is less original than the thing itself.