柏拉图的“一”和“多”

On Plato's One and Many

文章尝试解释在柏拉图多个文本中出现的令人困惑的"一是多"论题。通过对柏拉图几个重要文本的分析,表明这个问题跟柏拉图理念论中的两个重要问题有莫大的关联:(一)理念与个别事物的关系问题;(二)理念自身的建构问题。在《斐多》、《理想国》等所谓柏拉图"中期对话"中,理念论被提出来用以解释存在和宇宙万有问题,但柏拉图在这里并没有考虑理念论自身可能引发的以上两个严重问题。在《巴门尼德》中,第一部分将问题(一)作为难题提出,但并未得到明确的解决。这个问题搁置的同时,倒是对问题(二)的解决提供了思路。理念自身以类似后来所说"通种"方式结合,"一是多"是其宗旨。在《斐利布》中不但涉及到了问题(二),并用"划分法"达到"一是多",而且对问题(一)有了更根本的解决方式。文章论述了柏拉图的"一是多"的多重意义,最后表明:在"一是多"之下,柏拉图的"一"仍具有其特别的超越性。

This thesis is trying to explain the issue of ＂one is many＂,which appeared in several texts of Plato,but he has never expounded thematically. This issue has intimate relationship with two important problems of Plato＇s theory of idea：（ 1） the relationship between ideas and individuals,（ 2） the construction of the ideas. In Phaedo and Republic,ideas were proposed to interpret the problems of being and the existence of individuals,but there was no resolution to these two problems which might arise. In my view,in part one of Parmenides,the first problem was developed but not clearly sorted out. In shelving the first problem,part two of Parmenides provides clue for the second problem. The ideas communicate to each other in the principle of＂one is many＂. In Philebus,not only the second problem was referred to by ＂division＂to reach ＂one is many＂,but there is a more basic resolution to the first problem. The thesis explored the multiple meaning of the ＂one is many＂and indicated that under the principle of ＂one is many＂,the ＂one＂of Plato still has special transcendence.