非行政处罚性监管能改进审计质量吗？--基于财务报告问询函的证据

Can Non-administrative Penalty Regulation Improve Audit Quality?——Evidence from inquiry letters

从证监会的各类行政处罚性监管转向证券交易所的非行政处罚性监管是近年来监管改革的趋势,本文以交易所发放的财务报告问询函为研究对象,检验了非行政处罚性监管对审计质量的改进作用。结果发现,上市公司在收到问询函后的年份被出具非标准审计意见的概率提高,且不同问询函特征对审计质量的影响程度不同:当问询函需要会计师事务所等中介机构发表核查意见,涉及内部控制、风险和诉讼等内容以及问题数量越多或公司延期回函时,审计质量提高的程度更大;问询函对审计质量的改进作用还受到产权性质和政治关联的显著影响;此外,企业在收到问询函后事务所要求的审计费用提高。

This paper examines the improvement of audit quality through inquiry letters on financial reporting issued by exchanges. It is found that the probability of being issued modified audit opinion is increased after listed comanies receive inquiry letters on financial reporting and that different characteristics of the inquiry letters have varied impact on the improvement of audit quality. When the inquiry letter requires that the accounting firm or other intermediary agencies to issue verification opinions, involves internal control, or risks and litigation, the more issues are involved or replies postponed, the greater improvement in audit quality there will be. Moreover, the improvement is significantly influenced by the nature of property rights and political connections. In addition, the audit fees are increased after receiving inquiry letters.