不同渠道权利结构下闭环供应链定价与服务决策

Pricing and Service Decision-making of CLSC Under Different Channel Power Structures

文章研究了一个制造商和一个零售商构成的闭环供应链。制造商通过零售商销售新产品和再制造产品,零售商在销售产品的同时还提供增值服务以增加更多的需求。制造商和零售商都从消费者手中回收废旧产品且存在竞争。通过建立博弈模型,分析三种不同渠道权利结构下零售商增值服务水平和回收竞争强度对供应链中各成员最优策略的影响并进行比较。结果表明：（1）无领导的市场结构对整个行业以及消费者更优;（2）竞争强度对三种不同渠道权利结构下最优解的大小关系没有影响;（3）零售商增值服务水平对闭环供应链在不同权利结构下的制造商和零售商的定价和回收决策,以及渠道绩效有重要影响,然而在每一种博弈模型中存在一个服务水平上限,且零售商无限制提高服务水平的决策并不是最优的;（4）通过研究发现在三种博弈模型下零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型下的零售价格是最高的。

This paper studies a closed-loop supply chain （CLSC） consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer sells the new and remanufactures products through the retailer, while the retailer provides retail service to increase more demands. Both the manufacturer and the retailer competitively collect used products from consumers. By establishing the game model, the author analyzes the influence of the retailer＇s value-added service level and recycling competitive intensity on the optimal strategy of each member in the supply chain under three different channel rights structure and makes a comparison. The results show that 1） a leaderless market structure is better for the industry and consumers as a whole; 2） the intensity of competition has no effect on the size of the optimal solution under three different channel rights structures; 3） the retailer＇s value-added service level has a significant impact on the pricing and recycling decisions of manufacturers and retailers in the closed-loop supply chain un- der different rights structure, as well as the channel performance, while there is an upper limit of service level in each game model, and the retailer＇s decision to increase service level without limit is not optimal; 4） retail price is the highest under the three game models of Stackelberg game model led by retailers.