摘要
近年来,反垄断领域的民事诉讼案件逐渐增多,反垄断私人实施逐渐成为贯彻竞争政策基础性地位的主要手段。我国的法律法规及司法实践也赋予了竞争者、直接购买者、间接购买者作为原告的资格,但扩大原告范围虽然有利于公平,却会减损效率,造成多重原告之间诉求矛盾,组织成本过高等诸多问题。为了以最有效率的方式促进公平,实现私人利益和社会利益的激励相容,应对反垄断民事诉讼不同原告进行成本收益分析,找到使用最低的诉讼成本实现最大的司法效益的"最佳原告",成为反垄断法实施的最佳执行人。
In recent years,the number of civil litigation cases in the anti-monopoly field has gradually increased,and anti-monopoly private implementation has gradually become the main means to implement the basic status of competition policy.However,the Civil Procedure Law restricts qualified plaintiffs to those who are directly interested,making it difficult for indirect purchasers or end-consumers to qualify as plaintiffs.The qualification of the plaintiff shall be determined according to the principle of"monopoly damage",and the "best executor"of the anti-monopoly law shall be selected by analyzing the number of downstream companies in the industrial chain and the market structure.
出处
《法学评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期100-110,共11页
Law Review
基金
笔者主持的国家社会科学基金项目"集体诉讼的功能定位及在反垄断法领域的应用研究"(项目编号:15CFX047)阶段性成果
关键词
反垄断法
民事诉讼
集体诉讼
原告资格
Anti-monopoly Law
Civil Litigation
Class Action
Plaintiff Qualification