摘要
基于博弈理论的网络安全防御策略研究,大多使用完全信息或静态博弈理论进行攻防过程建模。针对现有攻防博弈模型的局限性,以网络安全防御的蜜罐(Honeypot)技术为研究对象,从动态、不完全信息角度对攻防交互过程建模,提出了网络攻防扩展式博弈模型(Network Attack-Defense Extensive-Form Game Model,NEFGM),给出了扩展式博弈的斯塔克尔伯格均衡(Stackelberg Equilibrium,SE)求解算法,从而在权衡防御成本和收益的前提下提供决策参考。仿真实验分析验证了模型和求解算法的可行性及有效性。
Researches on the defense strategy of network security based on game theory mostly use completed information or star ic game theory to establish the model of offensive and defensive process. In order to solve the limitations of the existing offensive and defensive game model, this paper proposes a network attack defense game model based on the extensive form game,which is modeled in a dynamic way and has incomplete information. The honeypot technology of network security is studied, moreover, the solving algorithm of Stackelberg Equilibrium based on the extensive form game is given so as to make decision guidance for managers on the premise of balancing defense costs and benefits. Through the simulation experiment and analysis, the feasibility and effectiveness of the model and the solving algorithm are verified.
作者
潘子轩
许晓东
朱士瑞
PAN Zi-xuan;XU Xiao-dong;ZHU Shi-rui(College of Computer Science and Communication Engineering,Jiangsu University;Informatization Center of Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处
《软件导刊》
2018年第10期191-193,199,共4页
Software Guide
关键词
网络安全
扩展式博弈
蜜罐技术
博弈均衡
network security
extensive form game
honeypot technology
game equilibrium