考虑利他偏好的低碳供应链契约协调

Low-carbon Supply Chain Contract Coordination Considering Altruistic Preferences

以政府碳配额与交易政策为背景,研究了制造商向具有利他偏好的零售提供不同契约的供应链协调问题,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法对模型进行求解,分别讨论了零售商具有利他偏好时批发价格契约、收益共享契约和回购契约对供应链协调的影响,最后通过数值分析对结论进行验证。结果表明,考虑利他偏好的批发价格契约无法实现供应链协调,收益共享契约和回购契约均可实现供应链协调。

Based on the government carbon quota and trading policy, this paper studies the supply chain coordination problem of manufacturers providing different contracts to retailers with altruistic preferences, establishes the Stackelberg game model, and uses the inverse induction method to solve the model, respectively discussing the retailers with altruism. The influence of wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract and repurchase contract on supply chain coordination is preferred. Finally, the conclusion is verified by numerical analysis. The results show that the supply chain coordination can not be realized by considering the al-truistic preference of the wholesale price contract, and the revenue sharing contract and the repurchase contract can realize the supply chain coordination.