政治地理、企业内部控制与所得税税负

Political Geography,Corporate Internal Control and Income Tax Burden

已有文献证明了政治关联对企业所得税税负的影响，但对政治地理的税负效应研究较少，且没有涉及政治地理对企业所得税税负复杂影响的研究。本文通过手工收集中央政治局委员的工作地与出生地信息，构建了政治地理变量，以2013-2015年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本，检验了政治地理对企业所得税税负的影响，并深入研究内部控制质量对政治地理与企业所得税关系的调节作用。研究结果表明，政治地理的得分越高，公司的企业所得税税负越低，这种效应在国有控股企业中更为显著；内部控制质量会加强政治地理与企业所得税税负的负相关关系，内部控制质量越好，企业所得税税负就越低。

The literature has proved the impact of political connections on the corporate income tax burden, but the tax effect of political geography is less and does not involve the complexity of the impact of political geography on corporate income tax burden. In this paper, the political geography variables are constructed by manually collecting the workplace and birthplace of the members of the Central Political Bureau. The impact of political geography on corporate income tax is examined by using listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen A -share listed companies as a research sample. And in -depth studying the moderating effect of the internal control quality on the relation between political geography and corporate income tax is studied. The results show that the higher the score of political geography, the lower the corporate income tax burden, and this effect is more pronounced in the state holding enterprises; the internal control quality will strengthen the negative correlation between political geography and corporate income tax burden, thereby the better the quality of internal control, the lower the corporate income tax burden.