演化博弈视角下网络交易平台“刷单炒信”行为控制研究

The Control of "False Transaction and Credit Standing" Behavior in the Network Trading Platform from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

【目的/意义】为了分析网络交易平台上不同利益的策略博弈对"刷单炒信"行为的影响及其控制策略。【方法/过程】基于演化博弈论的视角,从实际运营状态出发,抽象出了影响网络交易平台和"刷单炒信"行为发起者选择策略的影响因素,进而构建了演化博弈模型及其支付矩阵,得到复制动态方程模型,利用雅克比矩阵分析演化稳定策略和收敛过程,最后基于Matlab工具进行数据仿真实验。【结果/结论】结果显示,网络交易平台和"刷单炒信"行为发起者之间存在策略选择相关性,通过设置合理的机制,可以使得两大利益主体博弈结果收敛到理想状态,"刷单炒信"行为带来的负面效应和控制"刷单炒信"行为带来的正面效应均影响两大利益主体的策略选择,通过设置合理的分配比率,可以减少博弈达成均衡的用时。

【Purpose/significance】To analyze the influence of the different interests strategy game on the ＂False Transaction and Credit Standing＂ behavior on the Internet trading platform and its control strategy.【Method/process】From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, starting from the actual operating state, the paper abstracts the influence factors of the network trading platform and the ＂ False Transaction and Credit Standing ＂ initiators＇ selection strategies, and then constructs the evolutionary game model, the payoff matrix and the replicated dynamic equation model.Using the Jacobian matrix to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy and convergence,at last the data simulation experiment is conducted based on Matlab.【Result/conclusion】Results show the strategy selection correlation between online trading platform and the initiator of ＂False Transaction and Credit Standing ＂ behavior.Through the setting of reasonable mechanism, the two stakeholders＇ game results are ideal convergence. The negative effects of ＂ False Transaction and Credit Standing ＂ and the positive effects of the control of this behavior can both influence the stakeholders＇ strategy selection, by setting a reasonable allocation ratio,the time to reach equilibrium game can be reduced.