奖惩机制下企业与贫困户在产业扶贫中的演化博弈研究

Evolutionary Game Study between Enterprises and Poor Farmers in Industrial Poverty Alleviation under Premium and Penalty Mechanism

针对目前西部山区产业扶贫项目屡屡失败的现状,构建了政府奖惩机制下的产业扶贫演化博弈模型。采用复制动态方程模拟有限理性条件下扶贫企业和贫困户的博弈过程,并分析了博弈均衡点的稳定性及其参数条件。在此基础上,进一步进行仿真模拟,分析不同影响因素对演化稳定策略的影响。结果表明：奖惩机制的引入对博弈双方的决策有明显影响,演化结果虽然很大程度上取决于系统的初始状态,但可通过改进奖惩机制来改变演化的走向,使系统收敛于较好的演化稳定策略。可以从合理控制奖惩金额、制定科学的监管机制及降低项目市场风险等方面促进产业扶贫项目的顺利实施。

In view of repeated failures of the poverty alleviation projects in the western mountainous areas of China,this paper proposes an evolutionary game model under premium and penalty mechanism of government. It describes the evolutionary game process of enterprises and poor farmers under bounded rationality by a replicator dynamics equation,and the stability of equilibrium solutions and their parametric conditions are analyzed. Furthermore,the influence of different factors on the evolutionary stable strategy is analyzed by numerical simulation. Results show that the premium and penalty mechanism have significant impact on the decision-making of both sides. The evolution results largely depend on the initial state of the system,but the evolutionary stable strategy can change to a better one by improving the premium and penalty mechanism.Therefore,the government should design reasonable premium and penalty,formulate scientific supervision mechanism and reduce market risk in the industrial poverty alleviation projects.