摘要
从企业较为关注的薪酬制度制定角度出发,将员工是否具有时间一致性划分为耐心和不耐心型两组进行对照,设定固定工资和激励计划两种薪酬形式,通过建立信号博弈模型,求解出劳动力市场上企业与员工之间所达到的贝叶斯均衡。研究表明:如果从企业实际支付角度出发制定薪酬政策,将会达成一个分离均衡和一个混同均衡;如果从员工实际感知角度出发制定,将会仅达成一个混同均衡。
This article focuses on the most attention-grabbing topic among enterprises--the establishment of compensation system,divides the employees into two types who are either patient or impatient depending on time consistency,considering two types of compensations--fixed salary and floating salary,and makes comparison between these two. By constructing a signaling game model,it gets the solution of Bayesian equilibrium between enterprises and employees in labor market. Result shows that there is a separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium when making compensation policy based on enterprises' actual pay while there is only a pooling equilibrium when making compensation policy based on employees' actual perception.
作者
姚佩怡
姚正海
YAO Pei-yi;YAO Zheng-hai(School of Economics,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433;School of Business,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou 221116)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期58-61,79,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(15BJY111)
关键词
薪酬制度
信号博弈
时间一致性
分离均衡
混同均衡
compensation system
signaling game
time consistency
separating equilibrium
pooling equilibrium