摘要
基于A县扶贫绩效的省级审核评估个案,从相关者利益博弈视角分析了在扶贫绩效第三方评估中,农户、基层政府、第三方评估机构(团队)等相关主体基于自身利益诉求和博弈信息结构特点而选择行动策略与行为,以及相关主体博弈行为对第三方评估客观的消解效应。在此基础上提出了提升第三方评估的专业性、提高贫困信息透明度、严格评估标准、加强对第三方评估监督等应对策略。
Based on the case of A county’s practice of provincial level third-party evaluation, this paper analyzed theaction strategies and behaviors of farmers, grass-roots government and third-party evaluation institution (team) whichbased on their own interest demands and game information structure, and the degeneration effect of the game behaviorsof related principal parts on the objectivity of third-party evaluation from the perspective of stakeholders’ game. On thisbasis, this paper has put forward countermeasures, such as promoting the specialization of third-party evaluation,improving the transparency of poverty information, being strict in evaluation criteria, strengthening the supervision ofthird-party evaluation.
作者
蒋天佑
JIANG Tianyou(Hubei Institute of Economic and Social Development,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430070,China)
出处
《湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2018年第5期68-73,共6页
Journal of Hunan Agricultural University(Social Sciences)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71541039)
关键词
精准扶贫
政府绩效
第三方评估
相关者
利益博弈
Targeted Poverty Alleviation
Government Performance
Third-party Evaluation
Stakeholders
Interest Game