基于动态博弈的PPP项目公共利益分配问题

The Public Interest Allocation of PPP Projects Based on the Dynamic Game

PPP项目运营期长,参与方众多;在项目建设和运营的过程中,容易对社会公众产生较大的影响,增加社会的不稳定性。在这种情况下,保护PPP项目的公共利益就显得至关重要。论文基于动态博弈,讨论了完全信息博弈中在PPP项目中政府部门和社会资本如何确定公共利益保护的划分比例,以及在确定分配比例的基础上,如何选择双方的努力程度。理论推导结果展示,政府部门和社会资本的公共利益分配比例与双方的贡献程度、收益分配比例成正比,与双方保护公共利益的成本成反比。此外,分配较多公共利益保护份额的一方在项目建设中倾向于减少自己的投入水平。

The PPP project has a long operation period and many participants. In the process of project construction and operation, it is easy to cause a greater impact on the public and increase the social instability. Under such circumstances, it is very important to protect the public interest of PPP projects. Based on the dynamic game, the paper discusses how do government departments and social capital determine the proportion of public interest protection in PPP project under complete information game, and how to choose the degree of effort of both sides on the basis of determining the distribution ratio. Theoretical deduction shows that the proportion of public interest distribution between government departments and social capital is directly proportional to the degree of contribution of both sides and the proportion of income distribution, and inversely proportional to the cost of protecting the public interest of both sides. In addition, the party who distributes a larger share of public interest protection tends to reduce its investment level in project construction.