股权激励下的纵向兼任高管与企业价值研究

Study on Vertical Interlocks of Executives and Corporate Value Based on Preferences of Equity Incentive Mode

基于委托代理理论和管理层权力理论,以2011~2015年A股公司为样本,研究不同股权激励方式下纵向兼任高管如何影响企业价值。通过多元回归法进行实证检验,结果表明,在选择股票期权激励的公司中,纵向兼任高管对企业价值有负面影响;纵向兼任高管与企业价值的负相关关系集中于非国有企业。以成长期、成熟期和衰退期对上市公司进行分组回归,发现在成熟期企业中,纵向兼任高管降低企业价值。研究认为在新兴市场中纵向兼任高管未能有效缓解代理问题,大股东通过纵向兼任高管加强对上市公司的控制并获取控制权收益,从而降低企业价值。

Based on the principal-agent theory and management power theory, in this paper, we use a dataset of Chinese listed firms which have posted equity incentive plans during 2011-2015, to examine how vertical interlocks of executives affect corporate value when they had preferences of equity incentive. We find that in stock option mode company, vertical interlocks of executives have significant negative effects on corporate value. And this negative correlation concentrates on non-state-owned firms. Through more examinations we find that vertical interlocks of executives decrease corporate value, especially in mature-period firms which choose stock option mode. It shows that in emerging market interlocks of executives can＇ t solve principal-agent issues, the major stockholders strengthen their control over listed companies and obtain surplus interest through vertical interlocks of executives, thereby reducing the corporate value. This paper puts forward policy recommendations for regulators and investors.