群体规范对矿工违章行为的作用机制研究

Mechanism of Group Norms on Miners' Violation Behaviors

为研究群体规范对矿工违章行为的作用机制,建立矿工与煤矿安监人员之间的演化博弈模型,探讨矿工群体遵守和违反企业规章制度的情境条件,分析矿工与煤矿安监人员在群体规范影响下的行为演化过程。结果表明:监察和处罚无法有效遏制矿工的违章行为,群体规范的性质和强度是决定违章行为产生和扩散的关键因素,通过对这些因素的调控主动引导矿工群体形成良性的群体作业规范,以此实现对违章行为的有效控制。

In order to study the mechanism of group regulation on the illegal behavior of miners, we build the evolutionary game model between miners and safety supervisors, discuss the situations that miners obey and violate the rules and regulations of the enterprises, analyze the behavior evolution of miners and coal mine safety supervisors under the influence of group norms. The result shows that supervision and punishment can not effectively curb the illegal behavior of miners, the nature and intensity of group norms are the key factors that determine the formation and diffusion of illegal behaviors. Through the regulation of these factors, it is necessary to guide the miners to form a benign group work norm, so as to realize effective control of illegal behaviors.