中小企业信息披露质量的治理机制

Governance Mechanism of Information Disclosure Quality for SMEs

当前我国资本市场的主要矛盾之一表现为投资者对高质量信息披露的“美好需要”与上市公司高质量信息供给不足之间的矛盾。中小企业是资本市场的重要主体之一．本文着重从治理机制角度考察了中小企业板上市公司信息披露的供给质量．研究发现：（1）高质量的内部控制有助于提高中小企业信息披露质量；（2）高管持股有助于内部控制功能的发挥，进而促进信息披露质量的提高：（3）超额薪酬激励会削弱内部控制对信息披露供给质量的提升效果．研究结果表明，中小企业要增加高质量信息供给，有必要继续完善企业内部控制体系建设；同时，适当的激励机制可以显著影响内部控制功能的发挥。

At present, one of the main contradictions in China＇ s capital market is the contradiction between the ＂good needs＂ of investors for high-quality information disclosure and the high-quality insufficient supply of information disclosure. SMEs are one of the important entities in the capital market. This paper focuses on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies in SMEs from the perspective of governance mechanisms. The findings are as follows： （1） High-quality internal control helps to improve the quality of information disclosure provided by SMEs; （2） Executives＇ shareholding contributes to the development of internal control and thus improve the high-quality supply of information disclosure; （3） Excessive remuneration incentive will weaken the effect of internal control on the quality of information disclosure. The results show that it is necessary for SMEs to improve the internal control in order to increase the quality supply of information disclosure. At the same time, appropriate governance mechanism can promote the development of internal control functions.