官员特征、晋升激励与地方财政教育支出行为

Local Official Characteristics,Promotion Incentive and Local Financial Education Expenditure

基于中国政治集权和财政分权的制度特征,探讨地方官员特征及晋升激励行为对地方财政教育支出影响。利用2004—2015年的省会及副省级城市面板数据,研究发现不同特征的地方官员会对当地教育支出行为产生显著影响,市长的年龄与教育支出存在明显正相关关系,任期越长的官员建设地方经济业绩的动机越强而不利于教育支出,市委书记和市长教育背景对教育支出的影响分别体现在不同专业和学历教育上,而转移支付对纠正地方官员的轻教育行为起到某些积极作用,过度重视经济增长速度会对教育投入产生挤出效应,但经济发展使得地方政府更加有财力发展教育。

Under the political centralization and fiscal decentralization system,this article using the panel data of provincial and sub-provincial cities from 2004 to 2015,elucidates the effects of local officials＇ personal characteristics and promotion incentives on local education expenditure.The finding suggests local officials＇ with different characteristics have different impact on local education expenditure.Older mayors tend to more education expenditure,mayors＇ major and secretaries＇ degree may effect education expenditure,both mayors and secretaries have no motivation to increase education expenditure with their term grows.Fiscal transfer constrains local fiscal autonomy,which rectifies local officials＇ negative behavior on education,and guarantee education expenditure.Excessive attention to economic growth will have a crowding effect on investment in education,but the development of economic level makes the local government more financial development education.