抗战时期蒋介石访问印度的再考察

A Restudy of Chiang Kai-shek's Visit to India During the Anti-Japanese War

太平洋战争爆发后,蒋介石的大国意识和参与国际事务的意愿日益增强,1942年的印度之行是蒋介石以大国领导人身份参与国际事务的一次重要尝试。出于对日作战的共同目标和战后亚洲格局的考虑,蒋介石在力图说服甘地放弃不合作政策及支持同盟国作战的同时,又不顾英国的反对,公开敦促英国从速赋予印度国民以政治上之实权。之后,蒋介石又策动美国对英国施压,反对英印政府逮捕甘地。蒋介石由中立调停到以美制英,再到直接反对的政策演变,一定程度上展现了战时中国参与国际事务的能力,但也反映出蒋介石在对英外交上的不够务实。

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, China became an important force of the Anti-Fascist League and its international status significantly improved. Meanwhile, China＇s consciousness of great power developed, and its confidence in actively participating in international affairs thus enhanced. Britain observed with suspicion and precaution against China＇s rise during the war, in which it was afraid of a possible conflict if China became stronger since it enjoyed considerable colonial interests in Asia. Britain and China, however, strived to maintain friendship and improve mutual relations, in order to defeat together the fascist regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan, as well as for the sake of the future post-war cooperation. The complexity of Sino-British relations was effectively a reflection of the transition of international order and the power shift of the two countries after the outbreak of the Pacific War. The visit of Chiang Kai-shek to India in 1942 took place precisely within such complex relations. Chiang Kai-shek＇s visit to India in 1942 was an expression of China＇s increasing aspiration to participate in international affairs, and a symbol of the improved status of China on the international stage. Previous studies mostly affirm the significance of Chiang＇s visit for the improvement of China＇s international status in regard of his participation in international affairs and support for the liberation of Asian nations, but rarely mention Chiang＇s policy changes during his visit to India and mediation of British-Indian relations. Using Chinese and British archives as well as Chiang＇s diary and other first-hand resources, this paper employs the meeting between Chiang and Gandhi, the latter＇s correspondence with the former and his eventual imprisonment, as a basis for a comprehensive and thorough study of the policies and disagreements between Britain and China during Chiang＇s visit to India and his mediation of British-Indian relations. It explores the internal reasons for the evolution of Chiang＇s policy from ＂neutral mediation＂ to ＂containing Britain via America＂ to ＂ direct confrontation＂, and argues that, while such an evolution exhibited the willingness and ability of the Chinese government to partake in international affairs, as well as the cautiousness about its own weaknesses, it also demonstrated a deficiency of pragmatic thinking in the diplomacy toward Britain on the part of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek＇s visit to India failed to convince Gandhi, Nehru and other members of the Indian National Congress to adjust Indian foreign policy;neither did it help Indian people gain any substantive political power; and to a certain extent it even damaged the Sino-British alliance quite the opposite. Previous studies tend to blame Britain for the failure of Chiang＇s mediation of British-Indian relations, without conducting any detailed analysis of the personal mistakes of Chiang himself. Chiang＇s fault mainly concerns three aspects： （1） He overestimated China＇s international standing and influence, and consequently the goal set for with the actual power he had. Chiang wanted to convince the In he visit did not correspond dian National Congress to abandon the policy of non-cooperation and call on the Indian people to fight against the Japanese together with the Allies, and in the meantime he wished to support the liberation of the Indian people and seek for post-war Sino-Indian cooperation; thus, he found himself in an embarrassing dilemma. （2） Chiang Kai-shek＇s preparation for the visit was inadequate. Continuous conflicts regarding the form of Chiang-Gandhi meeting escalated the mutual mistrust between China and Britain. （3） In the process of mediating British-Indian relations, Chiang mixed together personal feelings and national diplomacy. On the one hand, he emphasized his friendly relationship with Gandhi and Nehru, hoping to move the Indian National Congress with friendship so it will shift the non-cooperation policy; on the other hand, however, he responded to the voluntary goodwill of the British government according to his personal judgment, which resulted in the lack of clear criteria for both the Chinese government and himself to proceed or draw back.