“先验—偶然知识”研究的一个新视角——从严格区分指称与指称对象的角度看

A Novel Perspective of the Study of Contingent-a priori Knowledge: From the Standpoint of Division of Reference and Referent

"先验—偶然知识"是克里普克研究指称理论时做出的一个引人注目的认识论断言。"标准米""海王星"与"朱利叶斯"是与三大指称理论密切相关的经典案例。断言与案例的合法性问题共同构成当代语言哲学和分析哲学的热点与难点。指称与指称对象的区分是一个新颖的方法论,借助它不仅可以澄清三大经典案例合法性论争中的混淆与错解,而且可以为先验—偶然知识何以可能提供一个新的研究视角。

"The contingent-a prior knowledge" is a striking claim put forward by Kripke during his investigation of reference theory. "The standard meter", "Neptune" and "Julius" are classical cases. The legitimacy of claim and the cases are discussed heatedly in the contemporary philosophy of language. By separating reference from referent, we can not only clarify several confusion and mistakes in the study of three cases, but also provide a novel perspective of characterizing the problematic situation of the contingent a priori knowledge.