基于演化博弈论的行人与机动车冲突演化机理研究

Evolution mechanism of conflict between pedestrian and vehicle based on evolutionary game theory

行人与机动车冲突时,各自都会在经过简单判断后以一定的概率选择通过.本文根据人车冲突的实际情景提出基础收益、冲突损失、等待损失以及互让损失的概念,据此构建行人与机动车的冲突博弈矩阵,并依据演化分析范式,建立人车冲突演化的动力学模型.对不同交通情形下均衡点的位置、稳定性以及系统演化机理进行深入分析,发现不同的行人与机动车的冲突损失和等待损失相对大小,对应系统的演化方向不同,可能的演化方向包括"人让车","车让人","人让车,同时车让人"以及"人不让车,车不让人".此外,定义机会损失的交通概念,据此分析系统关于行人与机动车的互让损失以及机会损失的灵敏度,发现行人或机动车互让损失的增加对于各自通过概率有着上升促进和下降抑制作用,而机会损失的作用恰好与互让损失相反.本文建立的动力学模型可以为人车冲突演化方向的宏观调控提供理论依据.

When pedestrian and vehicle are in conflict, they will pass at a certain probability after they have made a simple judgment respectively. According to the actual situation of the conflict between pedestrian and vehicle, the concept of basic payoff, conflict loss, waiting loss and mutual avoiding loss are put forward. A game matrix of the conflict between pedestrian and vehicle is consequently established. Then the evolutionary analysis paradigm is introduced, and the dynamic model of the conflict evolution between pedestrian and vehicle is established. After that, the position and stability of the equilibrium point and the evolution mechanism of the system in different traffic situations are analyzed in detail. It is found that the relative size between conflict loss and waiting loss of pedestrian and vehicle are different,corresponding to different evolution directions of the system. The possible evolutionary directions include ＂vehicles first＂,＂pedestrians first＂, ＂neither vehicles nor pedestrians goes first＂, ＂vehicles and pedestrians do not yield to each other＂.In addition, in this paper, we define the traffic concept of opportunity loss, and analyze the sensitivity of the system to the mutual avoiding loss and the opportunity loss of pedestrian and vehicle. It is found that the increasing of the mutually avoiding loss of pedestrian or vehicle has a positive effect on improving the probability of each passing conflict zone, but it has a negative effect on reducing the probability of each passing conflict zone. On the other hand, the effect of opportunity loss is just the opposite to the mutual avoiding loss. The dynamic model established in this paper can provide a theoretical basis for the macro control of the conflict evolution direction between pedestrian and vehicle. For instance, the current conflict situation between pedestrian and vehicle in a city is ＂vehicles first＂. For promoting the traffic civilization, the transportation officials hope to change the current conflict situation to realize the ＂pedestrians first＂.According to the model established in this paper, some parameters of the game matrix on the conflict between pedestrian and vehicle can be changed by formulating relevant highway traffic regulations to adjust the evolution direction of the conflict between pedestrian and vehicle.