收益共享机制下的供应链纵向信息共享策略

Vertical Information Exchange in a Supply Chain with Revenue Sharing Mechanisms

研究了收益共享机制对供应链纵向信息共享决策的影响。通过建立动态博弈模型,求解促进信息共享的收益共享契约的制定要素,以此来控制整个供应链的博弈态势,使下游零售商在竞争中更为主动地进行信息共享;首先在两个零售商均共享信息、只有一个共享信息以及均不共享信息3种情况下得出零售商的最优订货策略;在此基础上得出收益共享机制下的制造商最优批发价。通过比较3种情形下的供应链成员的期望收益发现:在产品具有互补性时,制造商通过设定一定的收益共享契约,在分享零售商一部分收入前提下,可降低批发价格,激励零售商进行信息共享;且互补效应会作用于零售商的最优收益共享率,使信息共享系统达到帕累托最优。

This paper addresses the impact of revenue sharing mechanism on vertical information. By building a dynamic game model, the elements of revenue sharing contracts to promote exchanging information is analyzed, and the game situation of the entire supply chain is brought into control, to make the downstream retailers share their private demand signals more voluntarily. Considering three conditions under which both retailers share information, only one retailer shares information, and no retailer shares information, the retailers＇ optimal order strategy is obtained. On this basis, the optimal wholesale price is proposed by the manufacturer with the revenue sharing mechanism＇s coordination. A comparison of the expected profits of every supply chain node of these three conditions indicates that after a certain percentage of revenue sharing, contracts are adopted, and the manufacturer, who shall gain a part of income from retailers, is willing to reduce the wholesale price and discourage the retailers to exchange the information when the supply chain sells two complementary goods. Furthermore, the complementary effect generated by the complementary goods can act on the retailers＇ optimal revenue sharing ratio and benefit the supply chain entirely to be Pareto improvement.