RFID跨企业集成中供应链上下游企业的进化博弈

Evolutionary Game for RFID Integrated Between Upstream and Downstream Enterprises of Supply Chain

跨企业的系统集成是射频识别(RFID)技术应用于供应链管理的根本目标之一,以一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链系统为研究对象,从供应链中存在信息不对称的实际背景出发,考虑了RFID集成企业成员的有限理性、预期额外净收益、净收益分配系数、前期准备成本和突变概率等影响因素,建立了RFID跨企业集成中的供应链博弈模型。在模型求解与分析上,从静态博弈的角度,给出了供应商和零售商的混合战略纳什均衡解;从进化博弈的角度,给出了博弈方的进化稳定策略(ESS),分析了供应链博弈的进化稳定性,对供应链进化路径及其敏感性进行了数值仿真。最后,根据分析与仿真的结果,给出了一系列相应的管理启示。

Cross-enterprise system integration is one of the fundamental objectives of radio frequency identification technology（RFID） in supply chain management. In this paper, a basic supply chain consisting of an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer were considered. The influence of limited rationality on collaboration supply chain management was addresses by using an evolutionary game model. Starting from a realistic background of asymmetric information structure, the increasing connecting anticipated additional net payoff, the biggest net partition coefficient, the decreasing preparation costs and the smallest mutation probability, and other factors were considered to establish a game model in RFID cross-enterprise integration. Two different methods were constructed to solve and analyze the model. First, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution was given from the perspective of static game. Second, the evolutionary stable strategy（ESS） and evolutionary stability of the supply chain game were analyzed from the perspective of evolutionary game. Then, the evolutionary paths and sensitivity of the supply chain game were demonstrated by numerical simulation. Finally, a series of corresponding management strategies were given based on the above analysis.