摘要
康德没有对"物自身"何以可能进行直接说明,这导致他遭受了许多批评。在康德的划界中,"物自身"不能被认识,所以无法给出"物自身是什么"之类的论证,但可以通过物自身界与现象界先天的关系来指向物自身界的可能性。这种论证方式被康德称为"类比",即通过几个给定的项,先天地找出其与第四项的关系,作为指出第四项的标志。通过对《纯粹理性批判》中相关论证的梳理,我们发现,康德已经给出了"物自身"的两个标志:经验之外的"持存之物"和在"我"之外有物存在。这两个标志足以为康德的"物自身"概念辩护,证明"物自身"的可能性。
Kant did not directly explain how Thing-in-itself possibly caused him to suffer a lot of criticism. But we can still fnd some relevant arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason. In Kant's demarcation, Thing-in-itself cannot be recognized, so Kant could not give an argument like "what is Thing-in-itself", but can point to the possibility of things themselves through the priori connection between things themselves and phenomena. This way of proving is called "analogy" by Kant. Through several given terms, we cannot fnd out the fourth term, but only know that the frst three are related to the fourth. Through Kant's argumentation, we fnd that he gives two marks about things themselves: permanence of substance and things outside me. These two symbols are enough to justify how Thing-in-itself is possible.
作者
邝宁
KUANG Ning(Advanced Institute of Confucianism Studies, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China)
出处
《东方论坛(青岛大学学报)》
2018年第5期109-114,共6页
Eastern Forum(JOURNAL OF QINGDAO UNIVERSITY)
基金
福建省社会科学规划青年项目(FJ2018C102)
关键词
物自身
类比
持存之物
反驳唯心论
Thing-in-itself
analogy
permanence of substance
refute idealism