本地独立董事监督了吗?——基于国有企业高管薪酬视角的考察

Do Locally Based Independent Directors Fulfill Their Supervision Role? Evidence from the Perspective of Managerial Compensation in State-Owned Enterprises

利用中国A股国有控股上市公司2005-2013年的7,346个年度观察数据,本文试图从国有企业高管薪酬视角考察本地独立董事(简称"本地独董")的监督作用。结果发现,国有控股上市公司董事会中的本地独董越多,其高管的薪酬水平越低,同时高管的薪酬业绩敏感性也越低,而且本地独董对国有企业高管的薪酬业绩敏感性的负向影响在垄断行业和政府补助较多的企业中表现得更强。进一步研究发现,高管的超额薪酬仅与"运气"业绩相关,而与"非运气"业绩无关,本地独董在降低高管超额薪酬的同时,也降低了超额薪酬与"运气"业绩之间的敏感性。这些结果意味着,地理邻近的本地独董具有信息优势,监督能力更强,进而能更有效地约束高管获取超额薪酬的代理行为,同时也约束了高管利用业绩中的"运气"成分来为超额薪酬做辩护。

Using a data set of 7, 346 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share state-owned listed companies during 2005 to 2013, we attempt to investigate local independent directors＇ supervision effect from the perspective of managerial compensation. We find that when state-owned firms have more local independent directors in the board, managers have significantly lower pay as well as lower pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, local independent directors＇ negative effect on managerial pay-performance sensitivity is more pronounced in monopolized industries and highly subsidized industries. Further analyses reveal that managerial overpayment is only related to firm performance that is not caused by managers, and that local independent directors not only lower managerial overpayment, but also lower overpayment-for-luck- performance sensitivity. These results suggest that local independent directors, due to close geographic proximity, have more information and supervision advantages, thus are more capable of constraining managers from obtaining overpay or getting paid for performance which is result of lucky factors.