摘要
如何解释规范性现象的形成与效力,是当代哲学自然主义的核心问题。自然主义的主要策略是以因果的关系、机制解释规范性,因为因果性与规范性判断都具有模态含义,而区别于描述性判断。但是,这样的解释不可能是还原性的,且反过来说,也可以用规范性来解释因果性。塞拉斯论证因果知识是先天综合知识的观点,就实现了这种反向的解释可能性,提出了因果知识的规范性理论。根据这一理论,因果知识本身就是在陈述如何由原因项推论到结果项的"实质规则",它所呈现的语义内容乃是"以语用为中介的语义"。
One of the contemporary challenges to philosophical naturalism is how to explain the production and efficiency of normativity. A common naturalistic strategy is explaining normativity by causal relations and mechanisms, since both causality judgment and normativity judgement involve modal conceptions, which differs from descriptive judgment. However, such a naturalistic explanation is non-reductive, and conversely speaking, causality can also be explained by normativity, which has already been realized in Sellarsian account on synthetic a priori. According to his norma- tive theory of causal knowledge, knowing causes is to claim substantial rules for inferences from cause to effect, which suggests "pragmatically mediated semantic" contents.
作者
徐竹
XU Zhu(Department of Philosophy,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241)
出处
《中国人民大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期9-15,共7页
Journal of Renmin University of China
关键词
规范性
因果性
自然主义
塞拉斯
先天综合
normativity
causality
naturalism
Sellars
synthetic a priori