非权益性资产泡沫、企业家技术选择与产出效率

Non-equity asset bubbles,entrepreneur’s technology choice and output efficiency

抓住在中国经济快速资本化过程中资本在非权益性资产领域积累并形成泡沫、实体经济创新投资低效问题,深入到创新投资到成果转化的关键环节——企业家的作用。借助Matsuoka和Shibata非完全市场条件下企业家技术选择模型,限定资产泡沫的属性,在微观层面采用均衡分析方法探索非权益性资产泡沫对经济产出效率的影响机理以及内在关联机制得到：（1）非权益性资产泡沫通过提高企业家的外部资金成本,限制企业家投资创新生产项目,导致产出效率低下;（2）非权益性资产泡沫会降低企业家的资本积累,阻碍企业家投资创新生产项目,降低产出效率;（3）产出效率的提升,会提高企业家资本积累和债务偿还能力,促使企业家投资创新生产项目,反过来实现抑制非权益性资产泡沫、提高产出效率的目标。

Under the process of capitalization in China,there have much capital accumulated in no-equity asset sector,and which generated asset bubbles,there also is an issue that low efficiency of innovation investment in real economy.In order to explore the key point — the role of entrepreneurs — from innovation investment to achievements,it applies the Matsuoka and Shibata（2012） model on choice of entrepreneurs with financial market imperfections and asset bubbles.It discusses the mechanism about no-equity asset bubbles effecting on output efficiency through equilibrium analysis in micro-level.（1） No-equity asset bubbles confine entrepreneurs to invest innovation projects via increasing the external capital cost,and then make output efficiency down.（2） No-equity asset bubbles restrict entrepreneurs to invest innovation projects according to decreasing capital accumulation,and then lead to reducing in output efficiency.（3） A rising of output efficiency can improve capital accumulation and the repayment ability of entrepreneurs,which promote entrepreneurs to invest innovation project,in return,there will be success in restraining the expansion of no-equity asset bubbles and improving output efficiency.