弗雷格主义的两难困境

The Dilemma of Fregeanism

在弗雷格的表述中,弗雷格之谜与语言形式有一定的关系。一个自然的想法是对弗雷格之谜的解决——涵义理论——能够合理地说明该谜题所具有的特殊语言形式。从而,涵义相同能够有效地解释按规则同指现象。然而,这一论断会导致弗雷格主义陷入两难困境中:一方面,不可区分情景要求对涵义极端精细的刻画,否则即使是涵义相同的名字出现也不一定是按规则同指的;另一方面,极端精细的涵义反过来会错误地过滤掉一些直觉上可以算作按规则同指的出现。这一困境有着重要的哲学后果,即按规则同指并不能单纯由语义事实来解释,弗雷格主义可以有条件地接受这一后果。

In the formulation of Frege, the Frcge＇ s Puzzle has something to do with its linguistic form. One natural suggestion is that, as the solution to the puzzle, the theory of sense can reasonably explain the specific linguistic form involved in it. Accordingly, the sameness of sense can effectively account for de jure coreference. However, the above claim will bring about a dilemma of Fregeanism： on one hand, indistinguishable sense - state requires extremely fine - grained characterization of sense ; otherwise, the name occurrences sharing the same sense don＇ t necessarily corefer de jure. On the other hand, the extremely fine - grained sense will in turn incorrectly filter certain occurrences that are intuitively treated as de jure coreferential. The dilemma has some philosophically significant consequence, namely de jure coreference cannot be explained simply by semantic facts. And Fregeanism can accept that consequence .conditionally.