摘要
从20世纪80年代开始,为了解决心理因果性难题,心灵哲学家们围绕还原主义和反还原主义展开了激烈争辩。一方面,非还原物理主义哲学家利用各种方案挑战还原主义,另一方面,辩护心身还原主义的代表人物金在权,则试图在超越内格尔还原的基础上建构功能还原的模型。与内格尔和马热斯的还原定义相比,功能还原不仅能有效回应解释鸿沟问题和多重实现论证,也能克服桥接律则的局限,同时承诺与物理主义主张更为一致的实现关系。但是,由于心理感受性的困扰,功能还原仍无法适用于所有的心理现象。
In order to solve the problem of mental causation, philosophers of mind have launched fierce debates on reductionism and anti -reductionism since 1980s. On one hand, various strategies by non - reductive physicalists challenge roductionism. On the other hand, Jaegwon Kim who chooses to defend the position of mind - body reductionism constructs a model of functional reduction on the basis of criticism of Nagefian reduction. Compared with the definitions of reduction provided by Nagel and Marras, functional reduction not only effectively responds to the problem of explanatory gap and argument for multiple realizability, overcomes the limitations of the bridge law, but also entails a more consistent idea of realization with physicalism. However, due to the trouble from qualia, functional reduction still cannot be applied to aLl mental phenomena.
作者
郁锋
YU Feng(Department of Philosophy,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241,China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第10期15-21,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金青年项目"分析哲学和现象学对话中的知觉意向性研究"(13CZX049)
关键词
功能还原
内格尔还原
桥接律则
解释鸿沟
多重实现性
functional reduction
Nagelian reduction
bridge laws
explanatory gap
multiple realizability
