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规范非学历教育服务市场发展:一个关于柠檬市场治理的解释框架 被引量:8

Regulation of Non-degree Education Service Market:An Explanatory Framework for the Governance of the Lemon Market
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摘要 演进的柠檬市场理论认为,信息不对称和逆向选择导致的市场失灵并非一定带来市场萎缩,反而可能带来新的市场均衡。非学历教育服务市场具有柠檬市场的诸多特质,混乱的市场已经破坏了教育秩序、消解了主流教育价值、加重了社会焦虑。正如演进的柠檬市场模型一样,非学历教育服务市场非但没有萎缩消失反而逐步扩大,这种市场的深度柠檬化实际上增加了社会福利风险。应形成以政府为主导的公私合作治理基础,借助大数据技术建立信息平台,并积极引入第三方机构参与,能够创新治理框架,解决由于市场柠檬化带来的诸多问题。 The evolutional lemon market theory holds that information asymmetry and adverse selection do notnecessarily lead to market atrophy,but it is easy to lead to market equilibrium. Non-degree education service market hasmany characteristics of lemon market. It will bring deeper influence,for example,disorder of education order,elimination of mainstream educational value and aggravation of social anxiety. However,as the evolvement of the lemonmarket,the non-degree education service market is not shrinking but gradually expanding,but it can not cover the socialwelfare risks caused by the non-degree education service lemon market. The government-led public and privatecooperation,the information platform,and the third party organizations can innovate the governance framework and solvethe many problems caused by the lemon market.
作者 田晓伟 苏骁征 Tian Xiaowei;Su Xiaozheng(Center for Studies of Education and Psychology of Minorities in Southwest China,associate professor of Faculty of Education,Southwest University,& postdoctoral research member of Chongqing Academy of Social Science;Center for Studies of Education and Psychology of Minorities,Southwest China of Southwest University(Chongqing 400715)
出处 《教育研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第9期89-94,112,共7页 Educational Research
基金 国家社科基金2017年教育学一般项目“引导社会资本参与公共教育服务供给的创新机制研究” (项目编号:BFA170054)的阶段性研究成果.
关键词 非学历教育服务 柠檬市场 教育治理 non-degree education service lemon market education governance
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