延保服务的供应链收益共享合同选择

Revenue sharing contract of supply chain under extended warranties services

构建由单供应商与单零售商分别提供延保服务的单供应链模型,识别供应链协调的可行性与收益共享合同的协调区间,揭示不同参与者提供延保服务对供应链系统绩效的影响.研究发现:无论那方提供延保服务,收益共享合同都能协调供应链,当收益共享比例在一定区间时,供应链成员能实现帕累托改进,且不同参与者提供延保服务的供应链利润高低取决于延保服务成本与延保服务需求敏感系数.并进一步研究了产品需求敏感系数、延保服务需求敏感系数、延保服务成本及延保服务时长对收益分配比例的影响.

This paper models a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where either the manu- facturer or the retailer provides pay-needed extended warranty separately. The paper identifies the coordination region of revenue sharing contracts and reveals the impact of different providers of extended warranty on the profits of the supply chain. The result shows that： The revenue sharing contract can achieve supply chain coor- dination; when the ratio of revenue sharing locates in a certain region, players can realize Pareto improvement. The profits of the supply chain depends on the cost of the extended warranty and the sensitivity coefficient of the extended warranty. Finally, it investigates what factors affect the ratio of revenue sharing.