考虑再制造的技术许可交易组合选择

Trading portfolios selection of technology licensing with remanufacturing

技术许可交易会使各交易方都陷入进退两难的境地.考虑一个同时生产新产品和再制造品的再制造商与一个OEM实施技术许可交易组合的选择问题,建立了三产品竞争下的四种交易组合博弈模型,探求各模型代表的交易组合下的产量影响因素、各方利润高低以及环保绩效.研究表明:再制造商的再制造品的生产成本的变化对OEM的新产品的产量无影响;双方只针对再制造商的新产品实施技术许可交易的可能性最小,同时环保绩效也较差;再制造商只为其再制造品购买技术许可是最终的交易组合,此时环保绩效最优;提高再制造商的新产品技术许可费用,却可使再制造商(OEM)的利润增加(减少).

Technology licensing deals can make the parties run into a dilemma. In this paper, trading portfolios selection of technology licensing between an OEM that produces a new product and a remanufacturer that produces both the same new product and remanufactured products is studied. For the four game models of trading portfolios, the factors affecting production in the trading portfolio represented by each model are studied, and each party＇s profit and environmental performance are compared. Results show that the production cost of the remanufactured products cannot influence the yield of the new products of the OEM. It is less likely that the parties only implement the technology licensing for the remanufacturer＇s new products, which experiences low environmental performance. The final trading portfolio choice by the two parties is that the remanufacturer only purchases technology licensing for its remanufactured products, while the environmental protection performance is the best. Improving technology license fees of the remanufacturer＇s new product can increase （reduced） the profit of the remanufacturer （OEM） unexpectedly.