我国《宪法》中人大预算权体系的构建

On the Construction of National People's Congress Budgetary Power System in Chinese Constitution

我国预算活动诸多问题的根源是人大与政府在预算权配置上形成了"人大和行政机关共同控制,偏重政府主导"的格局,人大无法有效代表民意监督和制约政府预算收支行为。预算制度的形成发展是现实中政治博弈的结果,不是细小的、一般性的法律关系,而是一种重大的、核心的宪法关系。单纯依靠《预算法》通过技术层面的改良解决由于预算权力配置的失衡而引发的问题显得力所不逮。我国《宪法》中人大预算权体系包括预算收入阶段的税收决定权,以及预算支出阶段的预算草案通过权、否定权、(减额)修正权、撤销权、监督权及问责权。

The root cause of many problems in China＇ s budget activities is that the NPC and the government have formed a pattern of ＂people＇ s congresses and administrative organs jointly control and give priority to government domination＂ in the allocation of budgetary power,and the NPC cannot effectively represent public opinion to supervise and restrict government budget revenue and expenditure. The formation and development of the budget system is often the result of the political game, which in reality is not small, general legal relationship,but a major,the core of the constitutional relation. Based on the study of the constitution text of relevant countries,this paper expounds the budget power system of people＇ s congress in China＇ s constitution includes the power of taxation in the stage of budget revenue and the power to pass, to deny, to amend, to cancel, to supervise and to ask for accountability of budget at the stage of budget expenditure.