竞争环境下高耗能制造企业节能方式选择

The choice between energy saving modes for competing manufactures

研究了两家竞争性制造企业面临自我节能和节能效益分享两种节能方式如何选择最优节能方式问题.首先建立两家制造企业相互对称的多阶段博弈模型,分析制造企业节能方式选择的均衡策略.结果表明存在两个对称的纳什均衡,当节能服务公司与制造企业的投资成本系数比率较小时,制造企业均应选择后者;反之,制造企业均应选择前者.之后将基本模型分别拓展到两家制造企业的投资成本系数不对称、初始能效不对称和分享期小于节能系统生命周期三种情形,进一步揭示了三种情形下制造企业节能方式选择的均衡策略.有意思的是,研究结果表明,在前述四种情形下两家制造企业的竞争强度均不会对制造企业节能方式选择均衡策略产生影响.

In this paper, we will discuss how two competing energy-intensive manufacturers facing selfsaving and shared savings options choose their optimal energy saving modes, First we develop a multi-stage game model based on the assumption that two manufactures are symmetric, then analyze the equilibrium strategies on the choice between energy saving modes for two manufactures. We show that there are two symmetric Nash equilibriums and that two manufactures will prefer the second mode to the first when the investment cost coefficient ratio of the energy service company to the manufacturer is small;otherwise, two manufactures will prefer the first mode to the second. Furthermore, the basic model is extended to situations with asymmetric investment coefficients of two manufactures, asymmetric initial energy efficiencies of two manufactures, shared time less than the life cycle of the energy system and we also show that the equilibrium strategies on the choice between energy saving modes in these situations.Interestingly, we find that the competition intensity between two manufactures has no impact on the equilibrium strategies in the four situations.