科技创新团队成员有限理性下的过程冲突博弈研究

Game research on process conflicts under the bounded rationality of science and technology innovation team members

由于科技创新团队成员个体的差异性,团队成员对于任务以及团队目标认知差异容易产生团队过程冲突.基于适度的过程冲突对团队协作较大的促进作用,研究构建了科技创新团队成员自身利益为博弈核心的过程冲突进化博弈模型,并对策略的进化稳定性进行分析（既保持适度的过程冲突）.研究结果表明：团队成员选择冲突的净收益大于选择合作的超额收益时,团队成员在长期进化学习的过程中,都会逐渐产生破坏性冲突（彼此不合作）;团队成员选择冲突的净收益小于选择合作的超额收益时,在成员长期的进化学习过程中,由于团队成员的有限理性,也无法借助博弈方成员的学习能力达到百分百的彼此合作,但是,通过对进化博弈结果中影响团队成员策略选择关键参数的调节,可以逐渐产生建设性冲突,达到使团队成员保持彼此合作的目的.

Due to the difference of individuals in the team of science and technology innovation, team members are prone to team process conflict due to the differences in tasks and team goals. Based on the moderating effect of process conflict on team collaboration, this paper constructs a process conflict evolutionary game model that focuses on the self-interest of members of ST team and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy（keeping proper process conflict）. The results show that when the net income of team members choosing conflict is greater than the excess return of choosing cooperation, the team members will gradually produce destructive conflict（non-cooperation） in the process of long-term evolutionary learning; the net income of team members choosing conflict is less than the choice during the long-term evolutionary learning process of members, due to the limited rationality of the team members,they can not achieve full cooperation with each other through the learning ability of the members of the game. However, by influencing the team members in the outcome of the evolutionary game, strategic choice of the key parameters of the adjustment, you can gradually generate constructive conflicts, so that the team members to maintain the purpose of cooperation with each other.