高管薪酬契约有效吗?——基于政府补助视角的实证检验

Are Executive Compensation Contracts Valid?——Based on the Empirical Analysis of Government Subsidies

政府补助作为企业业绩的组成部分,对业绩导向的高管薪酬契约会产生重要影响。而政府补助作为外生变量并未能体现管理者的努力与才能,那么包含政府补助的薪酬契约是否仍然有效成为有待检验的实证命题。以2007-2016年全部A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,实证检验政府补助与薪酬业绩敏感性间的关系。研究发现,政府补助显著提升了高管的薪酬水平,降低了薪酬业绩敏感性,薪酬契约静态无效,但从长期看,政府补助通过影响未来业绩从而保证薪酬契约的长期有效性。该结论在管理者权力大的样本组中得到验证。研究结论为国有企业高管薪酬改革提供了重要的借鉴意义。

Government subsidies have important influence on executive compensation contracts because they are part of the corporate performance. However,government subsidies fail to reflect efforts and abilities of executives,thus whether compensation contracts including government subsidies are still valid is an empirical question. Based on a sample of 2007-2016 Chinese A-share listed non-financial companies,this paper investigates the relationship between government subsidies and compensation contract. The empirical results show that government subsidies significantly increase the executive compensation and reduce the pay-performance sensitivity,thus making compensation contracts statically invalid. But on the long run,government subsidies can ensure the long-term effectiveness of compensation contracts by influencing future performance. The conclusion has been verified in the high management powerful sample group. The conclusion of this paper provides some guidance for the reform of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises.