“控制权”、基层政府行为与精准扶贫目标的实现和偏离——以豫西Y县为例

“Control Rights”,Grassroots Government Behavior and Goal of Precision Poverty Alleviation’s Realization and Deviation—A case study of Y County in western Henan

扶贫目标的偏离是当前精准扶贫领域研究的重要议题。本研究引入'控制权'理论,从压力型科层制和项目制交叉的视角对扶贫部门中资源的'控制权'进行了仔细分析。研究发现,中央的'高位推动'和层层施压,使得地方政府的利益和目标与中央趋于一致,这有助于精准扶贫目标的实现;但严格的科层制和项目制的理性化要求严重束缚地方政府的自主性,地方政府出于自身政治利益和政治风险做出与精准扶贫目标偏离的行为。基于以上结论,提出在精准扶贫领域解制型政府的思路,注重减贫成效的评估,变过程考核为结果考核,激发地方政府的自主性和积极性。

The deviation of the goal of poverty alleviation is an important topic in the field of precision poverty alleviation.This research introduces the theory of'control rights',and analyzes the'control rights'of resources in poverty alleviation department from the visual angle of the pressure-bureaucracy system and the project-cross system.The study found that the central'high drive'and layers of the pressure,so that the interests and goals of local governments tend to be consistent with the central government,which helps to achieve the goal of precision poverty alleviation,but strict bureaucracy system and the rationalization of the project system requires serious constraints on the autonomy of local government.The local government makes the behavior which deviates from the precision poverty alleviation target for its own political interests and political risk.Based on the above conclusions,the paper puts forward the idea of the model of loosening government system in the field of precision poverty alleviation,pays attention to the evaluation of the effectiveness of poverty alleviation,changes the process assessment as the result assessment,and stimulates the autonomy and enthusiasm of local government.