矿权改革中的利益博弈与资源型村庄兴衰的关联——一个典型案例的调查和思考

Interest Game in the Reform of Mineral Rights and Its Association with the Rise and Fall of Resource-based Villages——Investigation and reflection on a typical case

煤矿产权与资源型村庄发展密切关联,不同时期的矿权改革和政策调整给资源型村庄发展带来政策红利的同时,也产生了一定的负外部性。'有水快流'政策为资源型村庄发展集体经济、实现村庄经济复苏提供机遇的同时,造成了煤矿无序开采、资源浪费和水土流失等问题;煤矿承包在解决集体煤矿效率低下、提高煤矿经营效益的同时,造成煤矿经营者与所有者的利益失衡,煤矿经营者获得巨额利益,资源型村庄却要在没有获得煤矿利益的情况下承担煤矿开采的负外部成本,导致村庄衰败;地方政府通过煤矿整合采取村庄搬迁、沉陷区治理和土地复垦等措施,解决资源开采负外部成本内部化问题,以实现红利分享和成本分担的均衡,为资源型村庄发展提供条件。

the property rights of coal mines are closely related to the development of resource-based villages.The reform and policy adjustment of mining rights in different periods bring policy dividends to the development of resource-based villages,but also produce some negative externalities.The policy of'quick flow of water'provides opportunities for resourcebased villages to develop collective economy and realize economic recovery of villages,at the same time,it causes problems such as disorderly mining of coal mines,waste of resources and soil and water loss,etc.While improving the benefit of coal mine management,the interests of coal mine operators and owners are out of balance,while the resource-based villages have to bear the negative external costs of coal mining without obtaining the benefits of coal mines.Local governments adopt measures such as village relocation,settlement area management and land reclamation to solve the problem of internalization of negative external costs of resource exploitation,so as to achieve a balance between dividend sharing and cost sharing and it provides conditions for the development of resource-based villages.