基于应收账款融资的供应链企业违约问题研究

The Research on the Default Problem of Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Accounts Receivable Financing

在供应链金融应收账款融资模式下,建立了核心企业和中小企业违约问题的进化博弈模型,分析2方参与主体的进化稳定策略,旨在提高银行、核心企业和中小企业的共同效益.研究表明:核心企业和中小企业采用(守约,守约)策略的概率与企业的良好信誉带来的外部收益、对企业的违约惩罚、在供应链中企业长期合作稳定给供应链企业带来的额外收益成正比,与银行的贷款利率、应收账款总额、应收账款抵押率成反比.结合算例分析验证所得结论,为银行和供应链企业提供相关建议.

An evolutionary game model for the core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises default problem in the supply chain finance accounts receivable financing mode is set up,the evolutionary stable strategy of two parties involved in the subject is analyzed,aimed at improving bank,core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises mutual benefits.The study shows that the probability that core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises adopt(honesty,honesty)strategy is positively correlated with the external income brought by good business reputation,the enterprise′s default penalties,additional benefits of supply chain enterprises brought by long-term cooperation in the supply chain.The probability that core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises adopt(honesty,honesty)strategy is negatively correlated with bank′s lending rate,the total amount of receivable accounts,the receivable mortgage rate.The proposed conclusions are verified through a case study,and the relevant recommendations are provided for the banks and supply chain enterprises.