高管股权激励与银行债务契约定价:信号传递抑或风险规避

Executive Equity Incentives and the Pricing of Bank Debt Covenant:Signaling or Risk Aversion

以2005年～2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,通过双重差分倾向得分匹配法检验股权激励对银行债务契约定价的作用方向与影响程度。研究发现,银行整体上对于股权激励的实施予以负面评价,表现为索取更高的贷款利率与缩短贷款期限;负面影响在实施股权激励的民营企业中更加显著。经验证据支持银行风险规避假说。机制识别检验发现,高管风险承担是股权激励导致银行风险规避的主导性机制。进一步的研究发现,银行在授予股票期权的公司中表现出更加显著的风险规避。研究结论从债务契约定价的角度为实施股权激励的经济后果提供了新的证据。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2005 to 2014,the propensity score matching-difference in difference（ PSM-DID） approach is employed in this study to test the direction and influence degree of equity incentives on the pricing of bank debt covenant. The empirical findings show that the bank as a whole gives negative comments on the implementation of equity incentive,which is characterized by the demand for higher interest rates and shorter loan term; the negative impact is even more pronounced in the non-state owned enterprises. Empirical findings support the hypothesis of bank risk aversion.It is found through mechanism identification test that executive risk exposure is the dominant mechanism for equity incentives leading to bank risk aversion. Further analyses imply that banks perform more a significant risk aversion in companies that granted stock options. This study provides new evidences for the economic consequences by implementing equity incentives from the perspective of debt covenant pricing.