基于博弈理论的明星代言金融P2P平台可行性分析

Feasibility Analysis for Celebrity Endorsements of P2P Financial Platform from the Perspective of Game Theory

随着互联网技术的发展,理财的方式也多种多样,金融P2P平台应用而生,它们在推广之初会选择明星代言的方式来提升知名度。但当金融平台运作出现问题时,不仅会带来社会的混乱,也会给明星带来声誉以及财产的损失。基于此从不完全信息静态博弈理论出发,分析各个参与人的期望收益率和贝叶斯纳什均衡。研究表明,不管金融P2P平台处于高风险还是低风险,只要满足一定条件,明星就会为金融P2P平台代言。当金融P2P平台处于高风险时,明星和平台的收益明显低于低风险的情况,双方都会通过降低风险的举动来增加收益。本研究可以给明星、金融P2P平台和政府制定决策提供一定的参考依据。

With the development of internet technology,wealth management methods abound,including P2Pfinancing platform.At the beginning such platforms choose celebrity endorsements to promote popularity.Butwhen the financing platform is in trouble,it will not only bring social chaos,but also reputation damage andproperty loss to the celebrities.In this paper,we analyze the xpected return rate and the equilibrium of BayesianNash of each participant with the application of incomplete information static game theory.According to theresearch,when certain conditions are met,the celebrities will speak for P2P financing latforms regardless ofhigh or low risk.When the P2P financing platform is at a high risk,the earnings of celebrities and platforms aresignificantly lower than those with low risk,so both sides will increase their profits by reducing the risk.It canprovide some references for celebrities,P2P financing platforms and government decision-making.