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食品质量安全信息供给问题研究——政府vs第三方认证机构 被引量:5

Research on the supply of food quality and safety information
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摘要 食品质量安全信息有效供给是供求双方交易顺利进行的基础。界定食品质量安全信息的共用性与私用性是分析供给主体的前提。有能力承担认证信息费用的"优"质食品,通过食品排他性销售,信息的共用性转为私用性,为第三方认证机构信息供给提供了空间。研究结论说明,政府须担当满足公众食品质量安全基本信息需求的责任。在明晰产权的激励下,第三方认证机构向市场提供相应的食品质量安全认证信息,以满足消费者差异化需求。市场竞争对第三方认证机构信息供给的约束可避免政府行政垄断信息供给的固有缺陷。 This paper states that the effective supply of food quality and safety information is the basis of trade between the supply and demand sides. The definition of public and private property of food quality and safety information is the prerequisite about supplier.Since "excellent" quality food has the ability to bear the cost of the authentication information, and food is sold, public property of information into private, then the third-party certification body could be information supplier. The conclusion of this paper shows that the government should take the public responsibility to meet the public basic information needs of food quality and safety generally. Clarity of property rights can encourage third-party certification body corresponding to the market to provide certification information about food quality and safety to meet the different needs of consumers. The constraint of market competition mechanism on the information supply of third-party certification body can avoid the inherent defects of government administrative monopoly in the supply of information.
出处 《价格理论与实践》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第9期20-25,共6页 Price:Theory & Practice
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71373239) 浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地——浙江财经大学政府管制与公共政策研究中心课题(15JDGZ04YB)
关键词 食品质量安全 信息共用性 第三方认证机构 政府信息供给 Food quality and safety Information sharing Third-party certification bodies Government information supply
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