地方财政对转移支付长期依赖问题:理论机制及治理选择

The Dynamic Long-Term Dependence of Local Finance on Transfer Payments: The Theoretical Mechanism and the Choices of Governance

地方财政对转移支付存在依赖性,长此以往,会坠入"庞氏游戏"的恶性循环。本文首次在转移支付领域以经济断点对此进行半参数模糊断点回归分析。研究发现:地方财政严重依赖转移支付,其表现为延迟滚动长达3年,且政策系数为负。同时,在规模设计上,转移支付错位扩大了当期财政缺口;在结构配置上,并未实现区域间非均等的平衡性;在效用方式上,转移支付时滞性导致效应表达长期化,地方政府因"收入效应"及"利己"动机等道德风险行为,进一步增强了地方财政依赖性。因此,在理论方法层面,使用处理方法时,应谨慎选择转移支付滞后值做工具变量;在政策实践层面,应适度调整其投入规模及配置结构,减少返还性资金,并引入追责制。

The local financial situation has dependence on transfer payments, and it will fall into the vicious circle of Ponzi Game. In this paper, it is the first time to apply the economic breakpoint of the Fuse Regression Discontinuity Design （FRDD） in the transfer payment research field. The results show that local finance is heavily dependent on transfer payments, and its dynamic long-term performance is delayed rolling for up to 3 years, and the policy effect coefficient is negative. Moreover, the ,transfer payments somehow deteriorated the fiscal situation of the current period, without realizing the interregional unequal balance, and the time-lag enhanced local governments＇ fiscal dependence because of their ＂income effect＂ and ＂selfish＂ motivation. Therefore, we should prudently apply the utility of the time lag value while making methodological analyses, and as to the policy practice, the scale and the structure of transfer payments should be adjusted appropriately, such as minimizing returning funds and introducing the accountability system.