摘要
地方政府债务存在主体多元、规模庞大、形式隐蔽三大特征。本文针对性地构建包含协同审计机制、审计治理机制和信息互动机制在内的协同治理审计模式,进而采用演化博弈理论作为分析工具,设计地方政府债务协同治理审计演化博弈模型,对审计方和地方政府策略的演化稳定性进行分析。在此基础上,通过置入计算实验方法"情景—应对"思想进行仿真计算,模拟博弈双方采用不同策略的初始概率以及协同治理审计三个子机制的完善程度对演化博弈结果的影响。最后,基于模拟仿真分析结果,从强化协同审计机制、完善审计治理机制和建立信息互动机制三个方面提出通过地方政府债务协同治理审计,更有效防范地方政府债务风险的政策建议。
The three characteristics of local government debt are multiple bodies of local debt, large scale and hidden forms. In response to the three characteristics, the theory of cooperative audit, governance and information interaction are analyzed respectively. In this paper, evolutionary game theory is used as the analysis tool to build the local government debt audit management system. The paper analyzes the evolution stability of the main strategies of the auditor and the local government. Through a Scene-Response idea of the computational experiment method, the computational experiment method is used to simulate the initial probability of different strategies and the influence of the three sub-mechanisms of cooperative governance auditing on the result of evolutionary game. Finally, based on the simulation results, it puts forward the policy suggestions to prevent local government debt risk through the audit of local government debt from the perfection of the mechanism of cooperative audit, audit governance mechanism and information interaction mechanism.
作者
刘骅
陈涵
Liu Hua;Chen Han
出处
《财政研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第9期106-117,共12页
Public Finance Research
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目"地方政府隐性债务‘灰犀牛’风险的协同审计治理研究"(18BGL054)
关键词
地方政府债务
债务审计
风险监管
演化博弈
计算实验
Local Government Debt
Debt Audit
Risk Supervision
Evolutionary Game
Computational Experiment