绿色补贴、技术溢出与生态倾销

Green subsidy,technology spillover and eco-dumping

在传统战略贸易政策工具受到WTO限制的条件下,绿色补贴作为具备环境政策效果的策略手段正在被很多国家所采用.文章在多阶段双寡头竞争模型中研究了绿色补贴及其溢出效应对政府和企业行为的作用机制.结论表明,如果政府分别按照EOS和SOS准则为本国企业提供单边绿色补贴,则仅SOS准则下的补贴可通过改变古诺产出水平和环境排污标准改善本国的福利水平.但是,较之EOS准则,绿色补贴在SOS准则下使本国政府具有更强的生态倾销动机,从而使得本国环境存在恶化的可能性.此外,本国绿色技术溢出会提高本国及外国的排污标准,降低(提高)本国(外国)企业利润,进而减少(增加)本国(外国)福利水平.在模型一般推广的条件下,本国政府最优的环境政策是为企业提供最优非合作绿色补贴或征收最优合作税收.

As the traditional strategic trade policies are restricted by WTO, green subsidy, as a strategy with environmental policy effect, is adopted by many countries. In a multi-stage duopoly competition model, this paper investigates the mechanism of green subsidy and its spillover effect on government and firm behaviors. The results show that if the government provides unilateral green subsidies to domestic firms in accordance with the EOS and SOS respectively, only the subsidy under SOS can improve domestic social welfare by changing firms＇ Cournot output and environmental emission standard. However, compared with EOS, the green subsidy under SOS may give the government a stronger incentive for ecological dumping, which makes the domestic en- vironment more likely to deteriorate. In addition, owing to technology spillover, the domestic welfare declines as its emission standard raises and firms profit reduces, while the foreign welfare improves as both their emission standards and firms＇ profits increase. In a generalized model, it is found that the government＇ s rational environmental policy is to offer the optimal green subsidies in non-cooperative cases or levy the optimal taxes in cooperative cases.